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BOOK REVIEWS
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES:

A

GUIDE TO CURRENT

By Robert E. Cushman. Ithaca: Cornell
Pp. 248. $2.85.

PROBLEMS AND EXPERIENCE.

U. Press. 1956.

They are fighters, so they say, for freedom's rights;
More closely scanned, it's serf with serf that fights.
Mephistopheles in GOETHE'S FAUST, ii, 6962-3.
This volume is one of a series entitled "CORNELL STUDIES IN CIVIL
of which the author is the advisory editor. It is divided into nine chapters of unequal length, which treat the present status of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and petition; academic freedom; freedom of religion and the separation of church and state; the right to security and freedom of person; the civil liberties of persons accused of
crime; civil liberties and national security; and racial discrimination.
Two more chapters are called "Military Power and Civil Liberty" and
"Civil Liberties of Aliens," but they consist only of two or three pages
each, which do not exactly enrich the reader's knowledge on these matters. Each chapter is concluded by a highly selective bibliography.
Of course, it is not possible in a book of this size-or any onevolume book at that-to give a satisfactory list of everything that has
been written on civil liberties during the past twenty years or so. The
monthly, nay, weekly output in books, law review articles, essays, reviews, and court decisions on this subject is unequalled even by Lincoln,
the Civil War, and sex. It is a psychological truism that he who talks
too much and too loud about a given subject has a feeling of guilt and
uncertainty. He wants to convince the world that nothing is wrong,
whereas the opposite is true and not all is as it ought to be. In, say,
France or Switzerland, one hears comparatively little about the citizens'
respective freedom rights, yet they are assuredly present in those countries. Could it be that civil liberties ought to be seen but not heard?
This and similar considerations lead, or should lead, to the primary
question that is at the bottom of every discussion of freedom, namely,
whether man wants freedom. Dostoyevski's Grand Inquisitor' does not
think so. As a matter of fact, he presents the most forceful argument
that was ever written in support of the thesis that man does not truly
LIBERTIES,"
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want freedom. Rather, he wants leadership, "some one to worship, some
one to keep his conscience, and some means of uniting all in one unanimous and harmonious antheap," provided all this is being done in the
name of freedom, that is to say, by a leader who succeeds in convincing
man that he is free. And the Grand Inquisitor expressly informs us
that the human race not only wants to be led but also wants conformity.
"For the sake of common worship they have slain each other with the
sword. They have set up gods and challenged one another, 'Put away
your gods and come and worship ours, or we will kill you and your
gods!' " Whether or not this masterpiece in political science applies to
all mankind is not easy to say; but there are perturbing signs that it is
indeed made to fit our other-directed society, the one of the species homo
Americanus. "Tomorrow Is Already Here"'2 is a book that has for the
time being put the last convincing touch upon this reviewer's mind that
we are, and by and large, have been for a very long time a nation that
aims if not exclusively then at least preponderantly at money, omnipotence, and conformity rather than at individual freedom. Unfortunately,
it is no argument against this assertion that Americans appear to like
certain freedoms, notably the freedom from bolshevism, as has been so
vividly demonstrated by the recent upsurge of sympathy for the Hungarian refugees. To express a political predilection is not in itself a
sign of an objective respect for freedom. Would we have taken refugees
from Spain, waiving quota and visa requirements, under similar but reverse circumstances? We have still not recognized the communist dictatorships of China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Outer Mongolia;
but we did recognize Franco's government within a few days after his
troops had entered Madrid even though the civil war, that is, the resistance of the lawfully elected government, was not over yet. And we
recognized in word and deed Germany's annexation of Austria.3 And if
we did not actually help in creating the present Guatemalan government,
for the "election" of which 77% of the voters had been disfranchised,
we certainly have recognized it. Maybe we are "right" in doing all this,
to the list of which can be added, on the domestic scene, the decision of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service that members of the Nazi
party are not members of a totalitarian party;4 but then our love for
freedom is merely borne by the political necessity to fight bolshevism.

IN

2. JUNGK, TOMORROW Is ALREADY HERE (1954).
3. See BRANDWEINER, The International Status of Austria, in LAW AND POLITICS
THE WORLD COMMUNITY 221, 231-40 (Lipsky ed. 1953). This reviewer received let-

ters within two weeks after Austria's annexation that bore the dateline "Vienna, Germany" and the letterhead "American Consulate General," instead of "Legation."
4. In the Matter of B., Board of Immigration decision 445, May 27, 1953.
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In other words, we must humor our allies regardless how mephitic they
are. Maybe so; but this is a far cry from political tolerance, which is
indeed the backbone of civil liberties.
Of course, not everybody, in fact, not even a respectable minority,
seems to share my conviction. Most of my compatriots are of the opinion
that we have all, or at any rate most, of the freedoms we ought to have,
small infractions here and there notwithstanding. And if these staunch
believers are subconsciously or even semi-consciously disturbed-in their
belief, then they start to talk and write about civil liberties. Quod erat
demonstrandum.
Of this kind is the learned author's small book. He deals with civil
liberties as a category whose objective as well as subjetcive goodness is
not to be questioned, as something desired by everybody, something that
is here to stay if not even expand. The author's treatment is dogmatic
rather than either comparative-legal or transcendental. Yet occasional
inspections of the factual social situation are added. Within this framework the book might not be a poor guide to post-World War II developments; but the frame is much too narrow to provide an adequate survey,
however brief, of the status of civil liberties in the United States.
One can think of several ways of doing such a survey. For instance, an author could establish a catalogue of legally protected civil
liberties, describe their content in detail, especially against whom they
are enforceable, and discuss noteworthy violations and how they have
been dealt with. Such a treatment would amount to a legal textbook
much like one on any other subject. Another method, not infrequently
found among political scientists, would be to establish a list of civil liberties, not as they are created and protected under existing, positive law,
but rather as they ought to be. This naive, eighteenth-century natural
law method, however, can be implemented or preferably superseeded by
what might be conceived as a third method, viz., that of comparing the
existing civil liberties of positive law with that of other nations, especially with the United Nations' Human Rights Covenant, which must
5
be considered foreign law until the United States ratifies the Covenant,
which unfortunately seems to be a deferment ad Kalendas Graecas.
Or, a book on civil liberties might amount to a treatise that addresses
itself to the question of how "free" are the men and women of America
in fact? An inquiry of this kind would differ from the legal text of our
5. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom of

Nov. 4,

195o,

45 Am.

J. INT'L

L. Supp. 24 (1951), which has been ratified by most de-

mocracies. It is not to be confused with the legally not binding Universal Declaration
of Human Rights of Dec. 10, 1948, 43 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 127 (1949). See KELSEN,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 144-46 (1952).
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first category in the same way as a description of crime in America
would differ from a text on criminal law. This sociological approach
would be particularly fruitful in the civil liberties field. Law is a social
technique. It is a means by which society attempts to accomplish a desired result. This is done by imposing sanctions on the conduct that is
contrary to the lawmaker's desire. Thus if a given society does not wish
unmarried people to have sexual relations, it will threaten unmarried
intercourse with criminal sanction. If the lawmaker wants automobile
drivers to be careful, he might impose both civil and criminal sanctions
on violators of the statutorily expressed wish. The lawyer knows that
the law will be flouted many times and the sanction actually not imposed. Many drivers are reckless without being caught and even more
people conduct their sex affairs quite regardless of the desires of the
legal order. Yet, for what we might call a primer on the subject of tort
or criminal law, it is neither necessary nor customary to describe the factual efficacy of the law in conjunction with a description of the law itself.
Only on a higher level of inquiry will the scholar ascertain and describe
the effect of the law on human behavior, such as whether illegitimacy
or traffic accidents have decreased and, if so, whether this can causally
be ascribed to the legal system.
This is not quite so in the field of civil liberties. As far as I can
see, every writer, even of a small guide like Professor Cushman's present
book, pays much attention not only to the law of civil liberties and its
violations by those to whom the law is usually addressed-state and
federal governmental agencies-but also to "violations" by others, such
as private groups. Thus our author treats in the chapter on the freedom
of speech, press, assembly, and petition not only such alleged violations
as have occurred, say through governmental, especially postal, censorship, but also through "private curbs on speech and press." Actually,
however, it is untenable for an author to speak of violations of civil
liberties if he does not purport to deal with law violations. For instance,
the -author states correctly that "any minority group has the right to
propagandize its own views with regard to objectionable literature or
art." But it is a non sequitur to say that if those minority groups are
organized, start to impose secondary boycotts, etc., "a civil liberty issue"
is "involved." Just what does the author mean by saying "that a person's
right to boycott a movie, which he thinks objectionable, should not extend to a secondary boycott by which he undertakes to run the movie or
theater out of business for showing the picture he does not like ?" Does
the author's word "should" mean a reference to a legal norm? If this
were so, then certainly the reader ought to be apprized of it. Unfortun-

BOOK REVIEWS
ately, however, we all know that there is no law against the activities of
pressure groups, wherefore the "should" can be read only to mean "should,
in my opinion" or "should according to decent person's opinions." If I
cannot borrow one of the best novels of our time6 from the public library
because the librarian succumbing to the Biblebeltism of certain pressure
groups refuses to buy books that by some of those worthy citizens are
being regarded as "sexy," then this is indeed not a violation of anybody's
civil liberties. It is merely a state of affairs. Civil rights are either legally protected or they are not "rights" but mere postulates.
Moreover, it is a most unfortunate understatement to keep speaking
of "pressure groups" in the sense of organized boycotters. Arthur Miller's "'Deathof a Salesman" is one of the best of the very few American
dramas that are destined to become classics. It is being shown all over
the earth, be it communist Russia or conservative anti-communist West
Germany or Belgium. It is totally unpolitical. But it has seldom been
produced on any legitimate stage since the author had trouble of some
sort or other with a congressional committee. Howard Fast's biographical novels on George Washington, whom the author glorifies without
trying to make him a sort of secret radical, and Thomas Paine, in whom
the author shows greatness by contrasting his hero favorably with bloodthirsty revolutionists and radicals of his day, were lavishly praised by
practically every reviewer. But the author seems to be a communist-I
do not know whether Stalinist, Titoist or Bulganinist-and went to jail
for it. As a result, the American editions of his subsequent books cannot or at any rate are not being accepted by commercial publishers.' And
as to his novels written before Fast's "exposure," "Citizen Tom Paine"
has been expunged from the list of Modern Library book titles! Thus
one cannot readily accept MacLeish's statement that "there is no need
to despair of the future of the printed book."' His article deals with
Ezra Pound, whose poems, fortunately, are being published and sold as
if no treason trial had ever taken place. But Pound was "only" a fascist.
Our attitude, were he a leftist, would be quite different. The official
praise of dissent might extend to anti-communists even though they be
fascists but not so easily to anti-fascists. Be all this as it may, this attitude of disrespect toward nonconforming artists and intellectuals has
nothing to do with "pressure groups." The publishers' and producers'
6.

DE BEAUVOIR, THE MANDARINS

(Friedman transl. 1956).

7. FAST, SPARTACUS (1951), was published by the author himself. No film company would dare to make this excellent historical novel, or CITIzEN Tom PAINE at that,
into a movie.

8.

p. 5.

MacLeish, In Praise of Dissent, New York Times Book Review, Dec. 16, 1956,
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refusal to publish or present the Millers and the Fasts is not generated
by vociferous minorities. The publishers, theaters, and cinemas could
well bear that and they might even enjoy the additional publicity which
such group boycotts invariably create. But what if the boycotter is the
average American? Then a nonconforming publisher would loose his
business; and that he, another average American man, will not risk. No
civil liberty law can eradicate this state of mind. If it were different, the
congressional committees would be as harmless as they would be in foreign democracies.'
In America, one of our greatest actors, Charles Chaplin, was abused
by the Attorney General. This was automatically followed by a general
removal of his plays from the screens. In Europe he was afterwards
received by Princess Margaret of England, the President of Italy, and
other chiefs 'olstate. In Germany during World War I, Karl Liebknecht,
the radical socialist, received a penitentiary sentence for treason; but the
Berlin bar refused to recommend his disbarment. In Vienna a great
many conservatives and capitalists for whom any radical was anathema
used to read the communist scandal sheet Der Abend for a variety of reasons, mostly sensationalism, and in France anybody can buy and read
L'Humanitg openly. How many could dare in God's own country to let
himself be seen with a copy of The Daily Worker?
In his treatment of actual, positive-legal civil liberties and their
violation by governmental authorities the author often treads on dubious
ground. Civil liberty laws, notably the Constitution, have been construed
as addressed to governments, state and federal. Governmental agencies,
therefore, are the ones that must obey the mandate that there be freedom
of the press or assembly, etc., which is the correlate of saying that only
governmental agencies are capable of violating this law. Thus, if improper censorship is exercised against such classics as James Joyce's
"Ulysses," ' it can be properly regarded. as a violation of existing civil
liberties and it has been so treated by the author. On the other hand, the
activities of legislative investigating committees so far have not been
found by either Congress or the courts to be an interference with civil
liberties. However obnoxious those witch-hunting committees may be,
their activities are, by and large,"0 lawful and hence not a "violation" of
9. One might argue that it is now a matter of record that the main, if not sole,
purpose of these committees is "exposure" of their victims. See the quotations from
committee chairmen in the dissenting opinion in Watkins v. United States, 233 F.2d 681,
688, 692-99 (D.C. Cir. 1956). We might imagine that such things take place in France.
But we could not imagine that such an "exposure" of, say, Paul Sartre would have any
effect on his books or plays, his standing as an honored member of the Acadenic
FraiLaise,or in the community in general.
10. United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
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existing civil liberties. The exaction of loyalty oaths and the like from
state-employed teachers, especially those with tenure, may or may not be
labeled as contrary to civil liberties;" but the author treats the whole
problem under the heading of "Academic Freedom," which again constitutes a confusion of the civil liberties as we have them with those that
we, perhaps, ought to have. I say "perhaps," because I doubt whether
even the most radical code of civil liberties would ever embody academic
freedom in private schools.
In short, a book on civil liberties is yet to be written that describes
with accuracy our civil liberties as they exist, at the same time sets forth
the weaknesses of our particular civil liberty laws, and adds constructive
suggestions for improvement.
The weaknesses, as I see them, can be readily divided into three
groups: vagueness of the basic law; obsolescence of some existing civil
liberties and lack of many others which by twentieth-century standards
ought to be included; and narrowness of the group upon whom the obligation is placed to obey the laws pertaining to civil liberties.
The first fault, that of vagueness of the law, causes civil liberty
rights to be ambiguous and uncertain. It has been correctly stated that
the Supreme Court has the greatest imaginable discretion of law in view
of the broad wording of the various clauses of the Constitution." For
example, it depends entirely on the Supreme Court rather than on any
pre-existing catalogue of rights whether, under a constitutional clause
that merely speaks of "equal protection of the laws," Negroes may or
may not attend state schools or sleep in Pullman cars. Yesteryear it was
that way, now it is this way. The Constitution is completely silent on
whether and where an American citizen may travel. It needed a Supreme
Court decision rendered as late as 1941 to state that he may do so within
the forty-eight states ;3 but as to travel abroad we are still groping in
the dark. 4 Foreign laws are usually far more explicit on these and a
hundred other points, wherefore many individual freedoms are more
strongly protected as well as more easily determinable in such countries
11.

Violations, particularly of procedural liberties and rights have been most
GRISWOLD, THE 5TM AMENDMENT TODAY (1955).
12. See Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 351 U.S. 551 (1956) (dismissal
of tenure-holding teachers in city college for claiming privilege against self-incrimination invalid). But see Black v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., 351 U.S. 292 (1956) (discharge of private, contractual tenure-holding employee for similar reasons upheld).
13. "Who can deny that . . . the Supreme Court of the United States is not only
a legal but . . . to a great extent also a political agency?" Kelsen, Science and Politics,
45 Am. POL. ScI. REv. 641, 660 (1951).
14. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). This decision, however, is not a
true civil liberties case since it merely held that the prohibition against certain citizens
to move to California placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.

authoritatively treated in
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as France, Switzerland, Western Germany, or Austria.
Some of our freedoms are obsolete. I cannot share the author's
enthusiasm about the necessity of grand jury indictments or of jury trials
in civil matters involving as little as a day's wages. On the other hand,
an express official recognition-that is, a recognition by law rather than
by natural-legal postulate-of the freedom of teaching, of the right to
travel abroad even if the foreign office does not believe this to be "in the
best interest" of the government, of a man's right to vote regardless of
poll taxes or property requirements, of his right to be provided with
work and a decent minimum standard of living, and of many more rights
might be important and worthy of a protection in 1957 even though 170
years ago they were not so regarded. How far behind other nations do
we wish to stay?
The last but not least weakness of our civil liberties system consists
in the fact that, aside from relatively unimportant exceptions, the law
gives redress only against governmental interference. This is of particular importance in a country so favorably inclined toward private enterprise. The majority of our colleges are privately owned and, therefore,
under our system need not observe the recent interpretation of the Constitution's equal protection clause. A state' must not discriminate against
colored applicants for employment, at least as a matter of law, leaving
aside the question that the law on this point is more violated than observed; but private industries, including even a public utility, may do so
with impunity. The state or federal government may not censor good
books or movies, but, as was pointed out above, private groups or individuals can see to it that we are barred from them just as effectively;
and, as a matter of present law, it is these private groups rather than the
reader or the moviegoer that exercise their civil rights in so pressuring
others. Their freedom of assembly is protected, whereas freedom to
read is unenforceable against non-governmental organizations.
It is high time that some incisive study be made that covers the
whole subject, co-ordinating rather than confusing law, fact, and future
15. Vociferous press releases about the new (!) "freedom to travel" notwithstanding, no court has as yet decided that an American citizen-like that of every other
democracy-is free to go abroad whenever he pleases, unless he be a fugitive from
justice. The courts have merely ruled that, before a passport may be denied, the "applicant" must be given a fair hearing-without saying just what is to be determined at
such a hearing-and that an applicant must exhaust his administrative remedies before

he may apply to the courts. Boudin v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; Robeson
v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 907 (1956).
In the
Boudin case the passport was subsequently issued by the State Department, not in recognition of Mr. Boudin's freedom right, but because the Department changed its mind.
The Robeson case has been pending for more than three years and is still pending at
the time of this writing.
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law. And such a legal inquiry should be coupled with the sociological
investigation of how the American community is reacting to civil liberties. Without this investigation, an author's value judgments concerning "weak" or even "bad" law are strictly subjective. What is needed,
therefore, is a sort of Kinsey report on the average attitude of the American populace toward this or that freedom ideal. This of course might
bring us back both to Mephistopheles and his deeper counterpart, the
Grand Inquisitor, with whom this review started.
REGINALD PARKERt
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By William D.

Hawkland. Brooklyn: Foundation Press. 1956. Pp. xxix, 504. $9.00.
Professor Hawkland's book dealing with less than 100 cases in 500
pages is a refreshing compromise to law schools that are interested in
removing the "fat" from an expanding and over-crowded curriculum, and
to teachers who now try to conduct the course in two hours from casebooks designed for twice that much time. This book deals almost wholly
with instruments -and transactions falling within the ambit of the Negotiable Instruments Law and in its organization falls somewhere between
the functional approach of Steffen on one side, and the conceptual analysis to be found in the casebooks of Aigler, Britton, and Beutel. It is
unique in that an effort is made to sketch the law of suretyship in seventy
pages with dual objects of plugging the gap in a curriculum that does
not make suretyship available and to facilitate an understanding of
suretyship problems that overlap with bills and notes. In brief, this casebook deals separately with (a) promissory notes where the formalities
of negotiable paper, defenses, and transfer are considered in sufficient
detail; (b) drafts, preceded by an excellent introduction, but omitting decisions adequately illustrating some of the important problems arising
where a draft is accompanied by documents of title, and (c) checks,
where the risks of the paying bank are presented in a manner that makes
this the best part of the book. Explanations in the footnotes are complete and well written. The author has performed a commendable service in carefully annotating the problems raised by his cases and footnotes into the changes achieved by the Commercial Code, a servi.ce that
will be appreciated by the skeptic who hesitates to plunge head-long into
the language of the new law.
t Professor of Law, Willamette University.

